Supplementary Materials for

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Supplementary Analyses

Completion Associations

To ensure that survey completion at T2-T5 did not significantly differ by political party, we conducted logistic regressions, such that completion at each of the timepoints were regressed on political party. We find that completion did not significantly differ by party, *p*s > .23. Additionally, we conducted correlations between survey completion and variables of political satisfaction and well-being. As shown below in Table S1, completion was not significantly associated with political satisfaction and well-being, with two exceptions, as T5 completion was negatively associated with support for Trump's plan for the Gaza strip at T2 and happiness at T4. Given that completion is largely unrelated to these key variables and the two cases that were significantly associated indicated that those who completed the T5 survey were less happy/had lower support, we believe this rules out that completion was a potential confounder that explained our unexpected finding of increased well-being among Democrats.

Table S1

Completion

Variable		T2 Completion	T3 Completion	T4 Completion	T5 Completion
T1					
	Life Satisfaction	.02	.03	.02	.02
	Happiness	.01	.02	.05	.02
T2					
	Life Satisfaction	-	.06	.01	-.03

	Happiness	-	.03	.01	-.02
	Story 1 Support	-	.001	.03	-.06
	Story 2 Support	-	-.05	.01	-.13**
	Story 3 Support	-	-.03	.02	-.06
T3					
	Life Satisfaction	-.07	-	-.004	-.01
	Happiness	-.06	-	.03	.02
	Story 1 Support	-.02	-	.06	-.04
	Story 2 Support	-.02	-	.04	.02
	Story 3 Support	.07	-	.03	-.01
T4					
	Life Satisfaction	-.04	.03	-	-.10
	Happiness	-.03	.003	-	-.11*
	Story 1 Support	.06	.05	-	.01
	Story 2 Support	.07	.05	-	.02
	Story 3 Support	-.09	.01	-	-.07
T5					
	Life Satisfaction	-.10	-.01	-.08	-
	Happiness	-.07	-.01	-.06	-
	Story 1 Support	.03	-.01	.04	-
	Story 2 Support	.06	.06	.04	-
	Story 3 Support	-.04	.04	.04	-

Sensitivity Analyses for Party-Specific Growth Models

We conducted simulation-based sensitivity analyses using the *simr* package in R to estimate the power to detect the effects observed in our linear and quadratic growth models. The models were first fit to the full dataset, and we then used parametric bootstrapping (1,000 simulations; Satterthwaite degrees of freedom) to estimate sensitivity to those obtained effects.

For the linear growth models (see Table S2), sensitivity to the observed linear increases in well-being was moderate for both Democrats and Republicans (SWL: 61–71%; Happiness: 60–72%). In contrast, the study had very limited sensitivity (< 6%) to detect the small between-party differences in slopes, consistent with the nonsignificant interaction terms in the main text.

Table S2

Sensitivity (power) estimates for party-specific linear growth models

Outcome	Group (Effect)	Observed Slope (*b*)	Power (%)	95% CI
Life Satisfaction	Democrats (Time)	0.05	71.3	[68.39, 74.09]
	Republicans (Time)	0.04	61.0	[57.90, 64.04]
	Difference (Time × DemRep)	–0.01	5.6	[4.26, 7.21]
Happiness	Democrats (Time)	0.05	71.5	[68.59, 74.28]
	Republicans (Time)	0.04	59.7	[56.59, 62.76]
	Difference (Time × DemRep)	–0.01	5.2	[3.91, 6.76]

Note. Sensitivity estimates reflect the simulated power to detect the observed fixed effects from the party-specific linear growth models. All sensitivity analyses were conducted in R using the lme4 and simr packages. Each power estimate was generated by treating the fitted model parameters as the population-generating values and running 1,000 Monte Carlo replications per effect. All models included random intercepts and random slopes for Time at the participant level, used maximum likelihood estimation, and employed two-sided tests with $\alpha = .05$. Power values represent the proportion of simulated datasets in which the corresponding fixed effect was statistically significant under these specifications.

For the quadratic models (see Table S3), sensitivity varied by party. Democrats' quadratic terms were detected with high sensitivity (81–88%), whereas Republicans' quadratic effects which were substantially smaller in magnitude) showed low sensitivity (5–28%). This pattern indicates that the study was well-powered to detect Democrats' curvature in trajectories, but not the very small quadratic changes observed for Republicans.

Because these simulation models were fit directly in R, and the main analyses were conducted in Mplus, small discrepancies in the displayed coefficients reflect minor differences in rounding and estimator implementation across software packages. These discrepancies do not affect the substantive interpretation of the sensitivity analyses.

Table S3

Sensitivity (power) estimates for party-specific quadratic growth models

Outcome	Group	Effect	Observed Slope (*b*)	Power (%)	95% CI
Life Satisfaction	Democrats	Linear (Time)	–0.14	51.6	[48.45, 54.74]
		Quadratic (Time²)	0.05	81.2	[78.64, 83.58]
	Republicans	Linear (Time)	0.04	10.0	[8.21, 12.03]
		Quadratic (Time²)	0.001	5.1	[3.82, 6.65]

Outcome	Group	Effect	Observed Slope (*b*)	Power (%)	95% CI
Happiness	Democrats	Linear (Time)	–0.16	65.4	[62.36, 68.35]
		Quadratic (Time²)	0.01	87.9	[85.72, 89.86]
	Republicans	Linear (Time)	–0.03	8.9	[7.21, 10.84]
		Quadratic (Time²)	0.02	27.9	[25.14, 30.79]

Note. Sensitivity estimates reflect the simulated power to detect the observed fixed effects from the party-specific quadratic growth models. All sensitivity analyses were carried out in R using the lme4 and simr packages. For each effect (linear Time and quadratic Time²), power was estimated by treating the fitted model parameters as the population-generating values and running 1,000 Monte Carlo replications. All quadratic models were estimated with random intercepts and random slopes for Time at the participant level, included fixed effects for Time and Time², used maximum likelihood (REML = FALSE), and employed two-sided tests with α = .05. Power values represent the proportion of simulated datasets in which each fixed effect was statistically significant under these specifications.

Within-Person Models

We explored whether individual changes in support for the administration's actions correlated with changes in well-being. To test this, we first created composite scores of each timepoint's governmental action support. We reverse-scored items at T4 (i.e., Federal Judge Order to Rehire Government Workers) and T5 (i.e., Chief Roberts' Rebuke of Trump for Calling for Judge Impeachment and Federal Judge Order Blocking DOGE from Accessing Social Security), given that these were actions taken against the Trump administration. Support at each timepoint was reliable (T2: α = .87, *M* = 3.00; T3: α = .89, *M* = 3.00; T4: α = .86, *M* = 2.92; T5: α = .75, *M* = 2.61). We then centered the support, life satisfaction, and happiness variables, subtracting each individual's overall mean from each response, allowing us to test whether participants' variation from their own mean support predicts their variation in their well-being.

We conducted single-level regression models with cluster-robust standard errors, which accounted for clustering at the individual level. In contrast to our findings at the between-subject level, we did not find that individual variability in life satisfaction (*B* = 0.04, *SE* = 0.03, *p* = .190) or happiness (*B* = -0.02, *SE* = 0.03, *p* = .584) were associated with individual variability in support for the administration's actions. We suggest that we may not have found differences at

the within-level while we did at the between-level for a few different reasons. First, the weekly period may not have been long enough to capture meaningful within-level change, though enough for us to find between-level differences, showing that people who are more satisfied with administration are happier and become happier over time. In other words, participants may have reacted very similarly across stories and thus, most of the variability is between participants. Indeed, our intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for support was 0.63. Usual ICCs are between 0.10 and 0.25 (Snijders, 2012), thus an ICC of 0.63 is large, and shows that a majority of the variability, specifically 63%, is between participants, rather than within. Another potential reason could have been the selected stories. While we selected stories that were headlines in the news during that time, they may not have been as personally relevant to participants themselves. Changes in their well-being could have been more strongly associated with other governmental actions that were not tested in our study.

Well-Being and Support by Race

As shown in Table S4 (and visually depicted in Figure S1), we conducted t-tests examining whether there were racial differences in well-being in our sample. As our sample was predominantly White (74%) and we did not have large numbers of participants in each of our racial minority groups, we combined them in these analyses. Descriptively, we find that Americans of color reported lower life satisfaction and happiness at each timepoint, however, these differences were only significant at T2 and T5 for life satisfaction and at T2, T3, and T5 for happiness.

Figure S1

Differences by Race in Life Satisfaction and Happiness Across Timepoints



Note. Split violin plots depicting life satisfaction (a) and happiness (b) across five weekly timepoints by race. Each distribution reflects individual responses from White Americans (teal) and Americans of Color (gold), with superimposed means and 95% confidence intervals. Dashed lines connect race-specific means to highlight temporal trends.

Table S4

Mean Differences by Race in Life Satisfaction and Happiness

		White Americans M (*SD*)	People of Color M (*SD*)	Mean Comparison	95% CI of Difference
Life Satisfaction					
	Time 1	4.81 (*1.60*)	4.54 (*1.69*)	$t(599) = 1.79$, $p = .074$, $d = 0.17$	[-.03, .56]
	Time 2	4.81 (*1.59*)	4.26 (*1.73*)	$t(168.03) = 2.87$, $p = .005$, $d = 0.33$	[.17, .92]
	Time 3	4.79 (*1.58*)	4.53 (*1.75*)	$t(187.86) = 1.43$, $p = .153$, $d = 0.16$	[-.10, .62]
	Time 4	4.92 (*1.51*)	4.74 (*1.61*)	$t(417) = 1.09$, $p = .277$, $d = 0.12$	[-.15, .52]
	Time 5	4.99 (*1.50*)	4.58 (*1.68*)	$t(169.74) = 2.20$, $p = .029$, $d = 0.26$	[.04, .77]
Happiness					
	Time 1	4.68 (*1.60*)	4.54 (*1.60*)	$t(599) = 0.90$, $p = .370$, $d = 0.08$	[-.16, .42]
	Time 2	4.63 (*1.71*)	4.14 (*1.68*)	$t(434) = 2.58$, $p = .010$, $d = 0.29$	[.12, .86]
	Time 3	4.70 (*1.61*)	4.34 (*1.71*)	$t(443) = 2.00$, $p = .046$, $d = 0.22$	[.01, .70]
	Time 4	4.85 (*1.51*)	4.54 (*1.66*)	$t(417) = 1.84$, $p = .066$, $d = 0.21$	[-.02, .66]
	Time 5	4.93 (*1.57*)	4.45 (*1.72*)	$t(172.63) = 2.53$, $p = .012$, $d = 0.30$	[.11, .86]

Table S5

Mean Differences by Race in Support for Federal Actions

Topic of Agreement	White Americans M (*SD*)	People of Color M (*SD*)	Mean Comparison	95% CI of Difference
T2				
[a]Trump Administration's Views Towards Ukraine	3.44 (*2.44*)	2.67 (*2.14*)	$t(202.92) = 3.12$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.33$	[.28, 1.26]
[a]Trump's Proposal to Acquire and Develop Gaza Strip	2.76 (*2.08*)	1.96 (*1.67*)	$t(221.26) = 4.02$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.40$	[.41, 1.19]
[a]House of Representatives Passing Budget Bill	3.38 (*2.30*)	2.55 (*1.98*)	$t(206.17) = 3.60$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.37$	[.38, 1.28]
T3				
[a]Trump Administration's Tariff Actions Towards Canada	3.11 (*2.32*)	2.43 (*1.95*)	$t(240.50) = 3.09$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.31$	[.25, 1.12]
[a]Trump's Logging Proposal in National Forests	2.92 (*2.17*)	2.39 (*2.17*)	$t(241.09) = 2.56$, $p = .011$, $d = 0.25$	[.12, .93]
[a]Termination of Active National Institute of Health (NIH) Grants	3.46 (*2.51*)	2.85 (*2.27*)	$t(224.41) = 2.41$, $p = .017$, $d = 0.25$	[.11, 1.10]
T4				
[a]Trump Administration's Attempt to Deport Mahmoud Khalil	3.05 (*2.32*)	2.28 (*1.91*)	$t(230.64) = 3.42$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.35$	[.32, 1.21]
[a]Trump Administration's Decision to Pull Higher Education Funding	3.43 (*2.46*)	2.61 (*2.09*)	$t(224.27) = 3.36$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.34$	[.34, 1.30]
[b]Federal Judge Order to Rehire Government Workers	5.14 (*2.23*)	5.81 (*1.83*)	$t(230.91) = 3.13$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.32$	[-1.10, -.25]
T5				
[a]Decision to Deny Entry to French Scientist due to Trump Criticism	2.62 (*2.10*)	1.87 (*1.59*)	$t(244.43) = 3.82$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.38$	[.20, .37]
[b]Chief Roberts' Rebuke of Trump for Calling for Judge Impeachment	5.04 (*2.26*)	5.47 (*2.04*)	$t(205.11) = 1.79$, $p = .075$, $d = 0.19$	[-.90, .04]
[b]Federal Judge Order Blocking DOGE from Accessing Social Security	5.30 (*2.29*)	5.79 (*2.00*)	$t(211.38) = 2.10$, $p = .037$, $d = 0.22$	[-.96, .03]

Note. [a]Actions taken by the Trump administration and Republican lawmakers. [b]Actions taken against the Trump administration.

As shown in Table S5, Americans of color reported lower support for actions taken by the Trump administration and Republican lawmakers, in comparison to White Americans, *d*s ≥ 0.25, *p*s ≤ .017. Additionally, POC were significantly more supportive of two of the three actions taken against the federal government (i.e., order to rehire government workers, blocking DOGE from accessing social security), *d*s ≥ 0.22, *p*s ≤ .037.

Growth Models by Race

We also conducted exploratory models examining whether there were racial differences in well-being over time. Of the 522 participants that completed at least 2 timepoints (including T1), our sample was 74% White (N = 385) and 26% people of color (N = 137). Mirroring our longitudinal growth models to test whether Democrats and Republicans, we examined whether White individuals and people of color changed in their life satisfaction and happiness over time, we conducted longitudinal growth models for all participants who completed at least two surveys, utilizing. We used the full information maximum likelihood (FIML; Allison, 2010; Preacher et al., 2008) estimator to handle missing data. Each model had two levels. Level 1 represented within-participant variables (life satisfaction, happiness) that were measured across five timepoints, while Level 2 represented political affiliation, a between-participant variable. In Level 1, life satisfaction and happiness were regressed on time (on a weekly basis), creating a slope representing change over time for each of these variables. Time was centered at the first timepoint. Random effects were created for intercepts (T1 responses) and slopes and were allowed to covary. At Level 2, the intercepts and slopes were regressed on race, measuring whether slopes for White individuals and people of color significantly changed over time and whether these slopes significantly varied between groups.

Both White individuals (B = 0.04, SE = 0.02, p = .019) and people of color (B = 0.06, SE = 0.03, p = .016) significantly increased in their life satisfaction over time. These change

trajectories did not significantly differ from each other (B = 0.03, SE = 0.03, p = .388). For happiness, White individuals again showed an increase in happiness over time (B = 0.06, SE = 0.02, p < .001). In contrast, POC did not significantly change over time (B = 0.02, SE = 0.03, p = .452). However, these change trajectories did not significantly differ from each other (B = -0.04, SE = 0.03, p = .234).

Associations between SES with Well-Being and Support

We also conducted correlations between subjective socioeconomic status and well-being, finding that greater perceived SES was associated with more positive well-being at each timepoint, rs ≥ .24, ps < .001.

Table S6

Mean Differences by Race in Life Satisfaction and Happiness

	r	95% CI
Life Satisfaction		
Time 1	.37***	[.30, .43]
Time 2	.34***	[.26, .42]
Time 3	.29***	[.20, .37]
Time 4	.28***	[.19, .37]
Time 5	.29***	[.20, .38]
Happiness		
Time 1	.29***	[.22, .36]
Time 2	.30***	[.22, .39]
Time 3	.24***	[.15, .32]
Time 4	.26***	[.17, .35]
Time 5	.27***	[.18, .36]

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

For support of political actions, we found that SES was significantly associated with 3 out of the 12 actions, as greater SES was associated with greater support of the House of Representatives passing the budget bill (r = .15, p < .001), Trump's proposal for logging in national forests (r = .13, p < .001), and for rehiring government workers (r = .10, p = .049). All other associations were nonsignificant, |r|s ≤ .09, ps ≥ .062.